In On the Defensive, Peter Woit links to a Woit-type physicist who makes some comments about string theory. Not caring much about the string theory debate, I found a post by the Woit-type where his language, in my opinion, implies he has a typical misunderstanding of Popperian falsifiable, where Popperian falsifiable, as opposed to watered-down falsifiable, is the only falsifiable that makes any sense.
First, for those not willing to judge my arguments on merit, in Lee Smolin’s book, The Trouble with Physics, he mentions that Popper’s ideas about falsifiable are contested by some people. Two books I found as a result of Smolin’s book are Fashionable Nonsense and The Rationality of Science.
I haven’t read the two books I mention. I’m merely analyzing people’s statements about falsifiable using Popper’s problem-of-induction thesis, the basics of which are summarized in about the first 20 pages of his book. It’s Popper’s problem-of-induction thesis, clearly stated on page four, which makes it easy to tell when a person has no real sense of the meaning of Popperian falsifiable. That’s because the induction problem is 100% related to the use of the universal and existential quantifiers, the existential quantifier being the negation of the universal.
As I see it, the two main abuses of falsifiable by most people are 1) “in principle,” and 2) the divorcing of falsifiable from the universal and existential quantifiers.
With “in principle,” one of Peter Woit’s favorite ideas, I suppose the logic underlying falsifiable can still make sense. It’s just that if all you have is an “in principle” experiment that hasn’t yet been conducted, then as far as I’m concerned, that’s just plain ole religion; it’s religion when people make an “in principle” claim to be more than mere conjecture, when they use “in principle” to justify giving the science label to a claim.
With the second problem, when falsifiable is divorced from the context of “for every” and “there exists,” which are the universal and existential quantifiers of logic, then falsifiable becomes total nonsense.
For examples of such nonsense, we can look to the debate over evolution, and that brings us back to the physicist.
In Creationist Refutes Darwin’s Evolutionary Theory – A Rebuttal, the physicist uses the word “falsify” in relation to evolution, and I assume, because of the way he uses it, that it’s a “falsifiable falsify.” He (or she) writes,
I mentioned about this talk about a week ago of a creationist attempting to falsify Darwin’s theory of evolution. This morning, I found this response written by a physics major junior that easily threw a lot of doubt in the garbage that was spewed at that talk.
And because he also says,
This is why I’m very proud of this young writer who already has the skill (hopefully something he gained from his education) to analyze and question how such conclusions are made.
and validates this statement by the young writer,
Science is not done this way. If the data does not match your hypothesis, your hypothesis is incorrect.
If anything, the model shows that evolutionist hypotheses are accurate because of the long time period.
then I believe I’m safe in saying that this physicist has a typical nonsensical understanding of falsifiable, and that this is another example that falsifiable, because it makes no sense in its watered down version, has primarily become a useful tool for one person to try and intimidate another.
After all, those physicists are really smart people, and if what they’re saying makes no sense to us, then it must be that we don’t have the educational foundation to understand what they’re saying. And because we don’t want to play the “science denier fool,” we accept them at their word, don’t we?
Unless we happen to have a better understanding of logic than they do, in which case we start to chip away at their nonsense. After all, physicists aren’t logicians are they? And the study of proof based mathematics requires the use of logic more than the study of physics, doesn’t it?
Yes, it does. Much more, which begs the question of why Peter Woit hangs onto falsifiable after spending years working and teaching in the Columbia math department. That old saying rings so true, that you can dress up a physicist to look like a mathematician, by changing his pocket protector, but a physicist is still a physicist.
For the lack of time, from here I state some pertinent ideas.
Because “for every” and “there exists” are inherently tied into falsifiable, falsifiable only makes sense when we have a science claim that is not being contested, and that has been experimentally verified at least once. After that, the goal is to falsify the old theory with a new refined theory.
If a claim has not been experimentally verified by means of observation in the present, then falsifiable doesn’t apply.
According to Popper, falsification is not the same as falsifiable. As I understand it, falsifiable is a philosophy of science. Falsification is not.
Any past event which has been observed to have happened cannot be falsified. This is why falsifiable makes no sense as used by evolutionists. If something such as monkey-to-man evolution is such a sure fire thing, then it can’t be falsified. If it’s so sure that people deserve to be ridiculed as science-deniers for challenging monkey-to-man evolution, then surely it consists of verified past events, and it’s not just a theory.
And this where the contradiction of evolutionists come in. When it comes to falsifiable, they act as if evolution has to be treated as “all or nothing.” If evolution (monkey-to-man type) has been shown to have happened, then a sensible statement to apply falsifiable to would be something like, “For every species, that species came into being by evolution.”
If it was shown that some species came into being through creation, that would not falsify any past occurrence of some species coming into being through evolution. If evolutionists are open to the idea of evolution being falsified, and they treat evolution as an all or nothing theory, then it’s obvious to me that the evolution we’re debating hasn’t been observed to have happened.
The emphasis of falsifiable is falsifying “for every,” not falsifying “there exists.” Falsifying a “there exists” would result in showing “for every” is true, and experiment can never get you “for every.”
Concerning “in principle,” I was being led astray by the word “prediction.” The two ideas “new theory” and “new prediction” gave me the impression that a person would also need a new experiment. And if a person needs a new experiment, then how could falsifiable apply if the experiment has never been conducted?
Again, why would a person be trying to experimentally falsify “for every” if they’ve never experimentally shown “there exists.” However, it finally occurred to me that old experimental data could be used for a new theory and a new prediction.
Some of what I’ve said is my own ideas about what falsifiable is or isn’t, not what I read Popper said it is. I’m primarily working off of his problem-of-induction thesis. If he changed the game on me further in the book, that’s on him. The thesis rules.