The Nancy Pelosi Response of Type “Are you serious? Are you serious? Because I Don’t Have the Technical Knowledge to be Able to Respond to Your Challenge,” A Derivative Being the Woit-Type of Type “That Doesn’t Deserve A Response Either, Probably Because I Haven’t Thought About the Technical Logic Underneath Popper’s Falsifiable Any More Than Pelosi Has Thought About the Technical Details of the Constitution”

The link: When Asked Where the Constitution Authorizes Congress to Order Americans To Buy Health Insurance, Pelosi Says: ‘Are You Serious?’ (cnsnews.com)
A quote:
CNSNews.com asked House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) on Thursday where the Constitution authorized Congress to order Americans to buy health insurance–a mandate included in both the House and Senate versions of the health care bill–Pelosi dismissed the question [...]

Woit-types again demonstrating a fundamental misunderstanding of Popperian falsifiable, where I ignore the Popperian illusion that falsifying universal statements can establish science on a deductive rather than inductive foundation, for the negation of a universal quantifier is an existential quantifier, and Popper’s very objection to universal claims being based on the existential, on inductive evidence, means that the use of any existential quantifier in a science claim makes that claim inductive rather than deductive; in summary, a claim with a universal quantifier, after negated, contains an existential quantifier, therefore the negation of the statement is inductive and not deductive as Popper says, you can’t have it both ways; using experiment as a basis for a logic claim can never result in anything but inductive logic, even when falsifying a universal, but, again, I ignore Popper’s illusion for the moment

In On the Defensive, Peter Woit links to a Woit-type physicist who makes some comments about string theory. Not caring much about the string theory debate, I found a post by the Woit-type where his language, in my opinion, implies he has a typical misunderstanding of Popperian falsifiable, where Popperian falsifiable, as opposed to watered-down [...]

Falsifiable: Popper’s much to do about nothing much, and Woit and Smolin as the logically challenged (or two non-experimentalists who have a need for science by consensus)

Indirectly, through Lee Smolin, I finally get Peter Woit’s definition of falsifiable, which is actually nothing much more than the standard nonsensical nonsense that’s summarized by answers.com.
In Smolin on the Anthropic Principle, Woit says,
[Smolin] gives an eloquent explanation of the importance of falsifiability for a shared scientific enterprise.
I can assume, then, that Woit is satisfied [...]

The speculative idea that the reason physicists can be made to look like idiots is because they are idiots

In Shouldn’t Something Be Done? and Science and Science Fiction, Peter Woit is displeased with the History Channel’s program Parallel Universes, and so he says,
I don’t really see how an intelligent person can watch this thing and not come away with the impression that theoretical physicists are a bunch of idiots.
In this post, I would [...]

Chad Orzel’s cluttering up order with rational and intelligible modifiers, with the implication that the negation of the universal disproves the existential

In How Do You Falsify Rationality?, Chad Orzel asks, surprisingly,
What would it take to falsify the claim that “that nature is ordered in a rational and intelligible way?”
But how about a little context? He says,
When the subject turns to “Intelligent Design,” everybody always gets all Popperian, and starts going on about the need for falsifiability. [...]

The 3 remnants of Popperian falsifiable

I keep forgetting what seem to be the second and third remnant of Popperian falsifiable, so here are the remnants:

Science cannot show that something is true; it can only show something is false.
Science only requires that a person be able to support a claim “in principle.”
Science is a body of knowledge rather than (or in addition to) [...]

Having to derive my own definition of watered down falsifiable

Here is my definition for a watered down version of falsifiable:
A claim is falsifiable if it can be tested in such a way that if the test fails, the claim is false.
And so I had to work hard to come up with a succinct sentence that describes what it appears that many scientists really mean, [...]

Bogus science tests

I was looking for a post where Peter Woit says his blog attracts all sorts of weirdness. That’s because I was over at Lubs Motl, and I read some comments on his latest post, and I thought, “This is pure comedy.” And then I said to myself, “Uh, dude, are you that weird? I hope [...]

The Rationality of Science, more critique of Popperian falsifiable

From Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science by Alan Sokal, I was led to The Rationality of Science, by W. Newton-Smith, which supposedly contains some more critique on Popperian falsifiable.

Murray Spiegel, a mathematician’s axiomatic approach to physics

In Schaum’s Theoretical Mechanics by Murray Spiegel, Spiegel demonstrates a mathematician’s approach to physics. He writes:
Axiomatic Foundation of Mechanics
An axiomatic development of mechanics, as for any science, should contain the following basic ingredients:

Undefined terms or concepts. This is clearly necessary since ultimately any definition must be based on something which remains undefined.
Unproved assertions. These are [...]